If you have been reading my blog over the last couple of months then you know that I am now enamored of philosopher John Searle’s work in the area of how the social world is constructed and for what reason. I discovered Searle’s work by reading the book Evolutionary Psychology coauthored by another of my favorite authors, psychology professor Robin Dunbar. (Contact the Foundation for my executive summary of Dunbar’s book Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language.) I immediately gravitated toward Searle’s work because he regularly pulls and synthesizes information from such areas as psychology, information processing, cognitive models, sociology, evolution, biology, systems theory, ethology, innate behavioral systems, and, of course, philosophy. Does that list sound familiar to you? It should because those are the same areas that influenced John Bowlby as he developed his theory of attachment. I make no promise but my intention is to write a future blog post outlining how Bowlby and Searle’s respective bodies of work dovetail nicely. If someone else out there has taken (or would like to take) on this project, let us know.
I just finished Searle’s 2010 book Making the Social World. By Searle’s own admission, Making the Social World is an updated and refined version of his earlier 1995 book The Construction of Social Reality (which I also quickly poured through). Searle ends Making the Social World by talking about two concepts that fascinated me and should be of interest to philanthropists and non-profit organizations alike: positive rights versus negative rights. To offer up an unabashed teaser, when the US Declaration of Independence talks about the “unalienable rights” of Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness, these are examples of negative rights. What? How can these be “negative” rights? Well, read on and I’ll try to give you my best take on Searle’s explanation.
In a section entitled All Rights Imply Obligations (which appears toward the end of Making the Social World), Searle writes the following:
The important thing to emphasize [with respect to rights] is that rights are always rights against somebody [emphasis in original]. If, [for example], I have a right of easement to cross your property, then that is a right against you. And you have an obligation not to interfere with my crossing your property. Rights and obligations are thus logically related to each other.
As Searle goes on to point out (using mathematical equations no less, which I will spare you), to determine whether a right is positive or negative one must spend time assessing the relationship between right on one hand and obligation on the other. To stir the “rights pot,” if you believe that every human being has a right to healthcare, then determining the form of the obligation that that right demands will go a long way toward determining whether that right is a positive right or a negative right. In short, you can have consensus concerning the nature of the right while at the same time have conflict concerning the obligation. As an example, in his book Whose Freedom? (executive summary available), cognitive scientist and political commentator George Lakoff argues that both liberals and conservatives have a core sense of what freedom is. They even agree that freedom should be protected. However, the obligations that that protection entails differ greatly depending on whether one is using a liberal cognitive model or frame, or a conservative cognitive model or frame. According to Lakoff, liberals tend to protect the freedom of individual beings whereas conservatives tend to protect the freedom of incorporated beings. A bit further along Searle writes:
[W]hat we think of in the United States as basic rights, such as the right of free speech, are usually rights against the government. The actual First Amendment text, which guarantees us our right to free speech, simply says, “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Literally speaking, our constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech is a right we have against Congress.
Note that the First Amendment seems to offer up protection for both individual beings as well as incorporated beings. While we’re here, give some thought to what happens to this balance once the practice of paying lobbyists is raised to the level of a protected form of speech covered by the First Amendment. (As you probably know, in a 5-4 decision back in 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that corporations and unions have the same political speech rights as individuals under the First Amendment.) Taking all of this a step further, consider this article title: Supreme Court to Hear Cases on Obamacare and Birth Control. According to this LA Times article, these cases “raise the issue of whether a corporation, rather than just individuals, can raise claims regarding religious freedom.” The article goes on to state: “In 2010, in the campaign spending case known as Citizens United, the justices ruled that corporations have rights to speech protected by the 1st Amendment [as mentioned above], but they have never said whether corporations can claim a religious belief.” I may be way off base here but it sounds as if conservative groups are trying to secure rights for their particular cultural cognitive model by attempting to raise that cultural cognitive model to the level of religion. If all of these efforts pay off then it opens the door for others to claim cultural cognitive models as religions protected by the Constitution. At this point any person or group seeking to impose their particular cultural cognitive model on others could be viewed as trespassing on the right to religious freedom. As an example, a state agency could not impose a particular cultural cognitive model, say, behaviorism, on others without risking charges of violating the right to religious freedom. I’m aware of a case that happened here in New Mexico when the state tried to impose behaviorism on a Native American group via a state contract for mental health services. An interesting topic that, hopefully, I’ll take up in more detail in a future blog post. But for now, back to Searle.
So, in the above passage by Searle, he tells us that the principal relationship that ties together right and obligation takes the form of “against.” In other words, a right is against someone or some entity, like Congress. At this point, we still do not have a sense for what determines the valence of positive or negative. To get a sense for the valence or value of positive or negative, we have to get some sense for what type of action the target (e.g., the person or entity against which the right stands) is required to take. In the case of free speech in the US, the target, in this case Congress, is required to take “no action,” that is to say, “make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” According to Searle’s analysis, freedom of speech in the US is a negative right. To bring things closer to home, a property easement is a negative right because as the property owner I am required to sit and do nothing as the easement holder crosses my property. OK, enough of my interpretation; here’s how Searle describes the nature of negative rights:
At the time the American Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights were written, the rights that were supposedly self-evident were all negative rights. That is, they did not require any positive action on the part of the state or anybody else. They simply required that the state not interfere in such things as free expression or the keeping and bearing of arms.
OK, hopefully you have a feel for what negative rights are. Simply, a person or an entity (the possessor) has a right against another person or entity (the target), and the “against” action required of the target is to “take no action.” I guess you could say that negative rights are concerned with the “action of no action.” I’m guessing but this may well be why Searle calls them “negative” rights. OK, OK, but what of positive rights? Lets listen in as Searle talks about the transition from negative rights to positive rights. I believe that this description will reveal the nature of positive rights:
[T]he gradual expansion of the notion of human rights has led to the idea that there are positive rights, such as the right to an adequate standard of living, or the right to education, including higher education—rights that by their very definition impose obligations on other people. So, for example, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being for himself and his family including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary social services and the right of security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” The difficulty with such a statement is that in order for the statement to be meaningful there would have to be a specification of who is obligated to pay for all of these “rights.” Against whom exactly does one have all these rights?
So, here’s how I would describe positive rights: A person or an entity (the possessor) has a right against another person or entity (the target), and the “against” action required of the target is to “take some action.” With respect to the above stated positive rights—food, clothing, housing, medical care, necessary social services, etc.—the principal “take some action” takes the form of “paying some money.” To review:
Negative rights prevail when a person or an entity (the possessor) has a right against another person or entity (the target), and the “against” action required of the target is to “take no action.”
Positive rights prevail when a person or an entity (the possessor) has a right against another person or entity (the target), and the “against” action required of the target is to “take some action.”
As mentioned above, you can have consensus concerning whether a person or entity should possess a right while at the same time have conflict over whether the obligation action should be negative or positive. So, here’s a question for you: Within the world of philanthropy, do you think positive rights should be of chief concern or do you think that negative rights should take precedent? In exchange for the right to be exempt from certain taxes, the government tells private foundations that they are required to take the positive action of paying out 5% of their corpus to bona fide grant recipients. It would seem that private foundations enjoy certain positive rights. However, it does not follow that private foundations must fund organizations that have a focus on positive rights, such as paying for food, clothing, housing, medical care, necessary social services, etc. In fact, an article that appeared in The Chronicle of Philanthropy back in 2008 entitled A Charitable Divide suggested that conservative funders tend to fund those organizations that have a focus on negative rights—private hospitals, private schools, private museums—whereas liberal funders tend to fund organizations that have a focus on positive rights—public hospitals, food programs, housing programs, social services, etc. As the Chronicle article states: “Even as many big organizations like art groups and universities are reporting record increases [in raising funds], other charities, especially local groups that provide direct services to poor people, are struggling to get donations and keep up with rapidly escalating demands for aid.” With respect to conservative funders, much of these grant dollars go toward increasing endowments, which, one could argue, preserves the notion of negative rights. Although not explicitly framed using Searle’s concepts, suffice it to say that there is much conflict within the world of philanthropy over negative rights versus positive rights. Apparently there’s conflicit within the world of philosophy as well. Consider Searle’s position on positive rights:
In many discussions of human rights it sounds like the authors are simply saying, “It would be a good idea if,” and then they supply a statement of desirable “rights.” One might agree that it would be a good idea for everyone to have adequate housing, standard of living, and education. But it is another thing to say that you and I and everybody else are under an obligation to provide all of those things for other people. I believe that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a profoundly irresponsible document because its authors did not reflect on the logical connection between universal rights and universal obligations, and they mistook socially desirable policies for basic and universal human rights.
Yeow! That’s a pretty strong statement. But I think Searle makes a good point: Often a desire for what should be in society is couched using the rhetoric of rights. In addition, often these demands for certain rights are made without any conscious reflection on such things as obligations and payments. As a student of John Bowlb’s work in the area of attachment, what I have discovered is that the right—obligation—action required discussion takes place at a largely unconscious level and the presenting reflection, if you will, takes the form of anger. As an example, Bowlby’s theory of attachment was viciously attacked starting in the 1970s because many feminist groups perceived the following equation:
Bowlby’s theory of attachment establishes the universal rights of infants in the area of psychological development <==>
Infants have a right to safe and secure attachment as the royal road to proper psychological and personality development <==>
Biological mothers have an obligation to provide safe and secure attachment to their infants <==>
Ergo, biological mothers are required to take any and all necessary actions to protect the rights of their infants
Certain feminist groups became angry because their perception was that infant rights, in large part prescribed by Bowlbian attachment theory, infringed on the rights of women. For more on this theme, see the article by feminist psychoanalyst Susie Orbach entitled Why Is Attachment In the Air? Orbach writes, “Feminist analysts had a difficult time [back in the 1970s] with what they perceived as Bowlby’s valourisation of the maternal at a moment when we were trying to understand the relationship of women’s oppression to the structure of the nuclear family.”
The history of Bowlbian attachment theory is an example of what happens when claims to rights conflict. Here in Albuquerque we recently had a vote on late term abortions (abortions after 20 weeks). As you would expect, there were signs up all over town. One group of signs said effectively, “Respect the rights of women.” The other group of signs said effectively, “Respect the right to life.” This vote was over whose right—obligation—action required equation would prevail. Even within philanthropy, liberal groups tend to tell philanthropists, “Pay for food, clothing, housing, medical care, necessary social services, etc.,” while at the same time conservative groups tell philanthropists, “Endow private schools, hospitals, museums, etc.” I think the question that often gets overlooked is, “Should philanthropists have the right to impose rights?” More than ever philanthropists are being told to make more and larger general operations and multi-year grants. Philanthropists, rather than encouraging open and honest discussions concerning the right—obligation—action required calculus, tend to become frustrated and, in turn, express this frustration by imposing all manner of metrics on organizations as a form of psychological defense. What I see are right claims in conflict. Sadly (or thankfully depending on your frame), one way to avoid discussion of the right—obligation—action required equation is for funders to simply fund those organizations with a focus on negative rights (i.e., groups who advocate for our free market economy, or for the freedoms of incorporated entities). As the aforementioned Chronicle article points out, “[E]xperts agree that social-service groups need to collaborate more with one another and present solutions to donors, rather than stressing their needs [e.g., stressing their positive rights].” In other words, funders have a right to expect that social-service groups will spend some time going up stream (e.g., researching and framing the causes of social problems), and not spending all of their time pulling bodies out of the water while at the same time expecting funders to passively pay for such body-pulling efforts (see my November 19th, 2013, post for a description of this river metaphor).
To sum up, where positive right funders and grant seekers come together, there we should find robust discussions surrounding the right—obligation—action required equation. Where negative right funders and grant seekers come together, really, no further action is required. As a final suggestion, if a grant request seems to contain language surrounding a right, make sure to check for the following:
Who is the target of the right?
What obligation does the right impose on the target?
Is this a positive or a negative right? In other words, what action, if any, will the target have to take?
And if the target must take an action, what’s the nature of that required action?
Spend some time assessing whether the right request, obligations imposed, and required actions are appropriate.
One final point. Searle makes it clear that once a right or system of rights is put into place, that right or system of rights is often used to justify inappropriate actions. Yelling “fire” in a crowded movie theater is not an appropriate “freedom of speech” action. Having students stomp on a piece of paper with the word “Jesus” written on it (as happened at Florida Atlantic University earlier this year) is not an appropriate “academic freedom” action. We have certain scientific freedoms in the US. However, those freedoms should not be used to violate the rights of humans and animals. This is why the vast majority of research centers have Institutional Review Boards, Independent Ethics Committees, or Ethical Review Boards. Current attempts to raise “doing more with less” to the level of a right does not (or should not) create a rights environment in which codes of ethics and practice are circumvented.
Should Philanthropists Have the Right to Impose Rights?
If you have been reading my blog over the last couple of months then you know that I am now enamored of philosopher John Searle’s work in the area of how the social world is constructed and for what reason. I discovered Searle’s work by reading the book Evolutionary Psychology coauthored by another of my favorite authors, psychology professor Robin Dunbar. (Contact the Foundation for my executive summary of Dunbar’s book Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language.) I immediately gravitated toward Searle’s work because he regularly pulls and synthesizes information from such areas as psychology, information processing, cognitive models, sociology, evolution, biology, systems theory, ethology, innate behavioral systems, and, of course, philosophy. Does that list sound familiar to you? It should because those are the same areas that influenced John Bowlby as he developed his theory of attachment. I make no promise but my intention is to write a future blog post outlining how Bowlby and Searle’s respective bodies of work dovetail nicely. If someone else out there has taken (or would like to take) on this project, let us know.
I just finished Searle’s 2010 book Making the Social World. By Searle’s own admission, Making the Social World is an updated and refined version of his earlier 1995 book The Construction of Social Reality (which I also quickly poured through). Searle ends Making the Social World by talking about two concepts that fascinated me and should be of interest to philanthropists and non-profit organizations alike: positive rights versus negative rights. To offer up an unabashed teaser, when the US Declaration of Independence talks about the “unalienable rights” of Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness, these are examples of negative rights. What? How can these be “negative” rights? Well, read on and I’ll try to give you my best take on Searle’s explanation.
In a section entitled All Rights Imply Obligations (which appears toward the end of Making the Social World), Searle writes the following:
As Searle goes on to point out (using mathematical equations no less, which I will spare you), to determine whether a right is positive or negative one must spend time assessing the relationship between right on one hand and obligation on the other. To stir the “rights pot,” if you believe that every human being has a right to healthcare, then determining the form of the obligation that that right demands will go a long way toward determining whether that right is a positive right or a negative right. In short, you can have consensus concerning the nature of the right while at the same time have conflict concerning the obligation. As an example, in his book Whose Freedom? (executive summary available), cognitive scientist and political commentator George Lakoff argues that both liberals and conservatives have a core sense of what freedom is. They even agree that freedom should be protected. However, the obligations that that protection entails differ greatly depending on whether one is using a liberal cognitive model or frame, or a conservative cognitive model or frame. According to Lakoff, liberals tend to protect the freedom of individual beings whereas conservatives tend to protect the freedom of incorporated beings. A bit further along Searle writes:
Note that the First Amendment seems to offer up protection for both individual beings as well as incorporated beings. While we’re here, give some thought to what happens to this balance once the practice of paying lobbyists is raised to the level of a protected form of speech covered by the First Amendment. (As you probably know, in a 5-4 decision back in 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that corporations and unions have the same political speech rights as individuals under the First Amendment.) Taking all of this a step further, consider this article title: Supreme Court to Hear Cases on Obamacare and Birth Control. According to this LA Times article, these cases “raise the issue of whether a corporation, rather than just individuals, can raise claims regarding religious freedom.” The article goes on to state: “In 2010, in the campaign spending case known as Citizens United, the justices ruled that corporations have rights to speech protected by the 1st Amendment [as mentioned above], but they have never said whether corporations can claim a religious belief.” I may be way off base here but it sounds as if conservative groups are trying to secure rights for their particular cultural cognitive model by attempting to raise that cultural cognitive model to the level of religion. If all of these efforts pay off then it opens the door for others to claim cultural cognitive models as religions protected by the Constitution. At this point any person or group seeking to impose their particular cultural cognitive model on others could be viewed as trespassing on the right to religious freedom. As an example, a state agency could not impose a particular cultural cognitive model, say, behaviorism, on others without risking charges of violating the right to religious freedom. I’m aware of a case that happened here in New Mexico when the state tried to impose behaviorism on a Native American group via a state contract for mental health services. An interesting topic that, hopefully, I’ll take up in more detail in a future blog post. But for now, back to Searle.
So, in the above passage by Searle, he tells us that the principal relationship that ties together right and obligation takes the form of “against.” In other words, a right is against someone or some entity, like Congress. At this point, we still do not have a sense for what determines the valence of positive or negative. To get a sense for the valence or value of positive or negative, we have to get some sense for what type of action the target (e.g., the person or entity against which the right stands) is required to take. In the case of free speech in the US, the target, in this case Congress, is required to take “no action,” that is to say, “make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” According to Searle’s analysis, freedom of speech in the US is a negative right. To bring things closer to home, a property easement is a negative right because as the property owner I am required to sit and do nothing as the easement holder crosses my property. OK, enough of my interpretation; here’s how Searle describes the nature of negative rights:
OK, hopefully you have a feel for what negative rights are. Simply, a person or an entity (the possessor) has a right against another person or entity (the target), and the “against” action required of the target is to “take no action.” I guess you could say that negative rights are concerned with the “action of no action.” I’m guessing but this may well be why Searle calls them “negative” rights. OK, OK, but what of positive rights? Lets listen in as Searle talks about the transition from negative rights to positive rights. I believe that this description will reveal the nature of positive rights:
So, here’s how I would describe positive rights: A person or an entity (the possessor) has a right against another person or entity (the target), and the “against” action required of the target is to “take some action.” With respect to the above stated positive rights—food, clothing, housing, medical care, necessary social services, etc.—the principal “take some action” takes the form of “paying some money.” To review:
Negative rights prevail when a person or an entity (the possessor) has a right against another person or entity (the target), and the “against” action required of the target is to “take no action.”
Positive rights prevail when a person or an entity (the possessor) has a right against another person or entity (the target), and the “against” action required of the target is to “take some action.”
As mentioned above, you can have consensus concerning whether a person or entity should possess a right while at the same time have conflict over whether the obligation action should be negative or positive. So, here’s a question for you: Within the world of philanthropy, do you think positive rights should be of chief concern or do you think that negative rights should take precedent? In exchange for the right to be exempt from certain taxes, the government tells private foundations that they are required to take the positive action of paying out 5% of their corpus to bona fide grant recipients. It would seem that private foundations enjoy certain positive rights. However, it does not follow that private foundations must fund organizations that have a focus on positive rights, such as paying for food, clothing, housing, medical care, necessary social services, etc. In fact, an article that appeared in The Chronicle of Philanthropy back in 2008 entitled A Charitable Divide suggested that conservative funders tend to fund those organizations that have a focus on negative rights—private hospitals, private schools, private museums—whereas liberal funders tend to fund organizations that have a focus on positive rights—public hospitals, food programs, housing programs, social services, etc. As the Chronicle article states: “Even as many big organizations like art groups and universities are reporting record increases [in raising funds], other charities, especially local groups that provide direct services to poor people, are struggling to get donations and keep up with rapidly escalating demands for aid.” With respect to conservative funders, much of these grant dollars go toward increasing endowments, which, one could argue, preserves the notion of negative rights. Although not explicitly framed using Searle’s concepts, suffice it to say that there is much conflict within the world of philanthropy over negative rights versus positive rights. Apparently there’s conflicit within the world of philosophy as well. Consider Searle’s position on positive rights:
Yeow! That’s a pretty strong statement. But I think Searle makes a good point: Often a desire for what should be in society is couched using the rhetoric of rights. In addition, often these demands for certain rights are made without any conscious reflection on such things as obligations and payments. As a student of John Bowlb’s work in the area of attachment, what I have discovered is that the right—obligation—action required discussion takes place at a largely unconscious level and the presenting reflection, if you will, takes the form of anger. As an example, Bowlby’s theory of attachment was viciously attacked starting in the 1970s because many feminist groups perceived the following equation:
Certain feminist groups became angry because their perception was that infant rights, in large part prescribed by Bowlbian attachment theory, infringed on the rights of women. For more on this theme, see the article by feminist psychoanalyst Susie Orbach entitled Why Is Attachment In the Air? Orbach writes, “Feminist analysts had a difficult time [back in the 1970s] with what they perceived as Bowlby’s valourisation of the maternal at a moment when we were trying to understand the relationship of women’s oppression to the structure of the nuclear family.”
The history of Bowlbian attachment theory is an example of what happens when claims to rights conflict. Here in Albuquerque we recently had a vote on late term abortions (abortions after 20 weeks). As you would expect, there were signs up all over town. One group of signs said effectively, “Respect the rights of women.” The other group of signs said effectively, “Respect the right to life.” This vote was over whose right—obligation—action required equation would prevail. Even within philanthropy, liberal groups tend to tell philanthropists, “Pay for food, clothing, housing, medical care, necessary social services, etc.,” while at the same time conservative groups tell philanthropists, “Endow private schools, hospitals, museums, etc.” I think the question that often gets overlooked is, “Should philanthropists have the right to impose rights?” More than ever philanthropists are being told to make more and larger general operations and multi-year grants. Philanthropists, rather than encouraging open and honest discussions concerning the right—obligation—action required calculus, tend to become frustrated and, in turn, express this frustration by imposing all manner of metrics on organizations as a form of psychological defense. What I see are right claims in conflict. Sadly (or thankfully depending on your frame), one way to avoid discussion of the right—obligation—action required equation is for funders to simply fund those organizations with a focus on negative rights (i.e., groups who advocate for our free market economy, or for the freedoms of incorporated entities). As the aforementioned Chronicle article points out, “[E]xperts agree that social-service groups need to collaborate more with one another and present solutions to donors, rather than stressing their needs [e.g., stressing their positive rights].” In other words, funders have a right to expect that social-service groups will spend some time going up stream (e.g., researching and framing the causes of social problems), and not spending all of their time pulling bodies out of the water while at the same time expecting funders to passively pay for such body-pulling efforts (see my November 19th, 2013, post for a description of this river metaphor).
To sum up, where positive right funders and grant seekers come together, there we should find robust discussions surrounding the right—obligation—action required equation. Where negative right funders and grant seekers come together, really, no further action is required. As a final suggestion, if a grant request seems to contain language surrounding a right, make sure to check for the following:
One final point. Searle makes it clear that once a right or system of rights is put into place, that right or system of rights is often used to justify inappropriate actions. Yelling “fire” in a crowded movie theater is not an appropriate “freedom of speech” action. Having students stomp on a piece of paper with the word “Jesus” written on it (as happened at Florida Atlantic University earlier this year) is not an appropriate “academic freedom” action. We have certain scientific freedoms in the US. However, those freedoms should not be used to violate the rights of humans and animals. This is why the vast majority of research centers have Institutional Review Boards, Independent Ethics Committees, or Ethical Review Boards. Current attempts to raise “doing more with less” to the level of a right does not (or should not) create a rights environment in which codes of ethics and practice are circumvented.